An Introduction to Cyber Peacekeeping by Robinson, Michael et al.
APRIL 2018 1
An Introduction to Cyber Peacekeeping
Michael Robinson, Kevin Jones, Helge Janicke and Leandros Maglaras, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Cyber is the newest domain of war, and the topic
of cyber warfare is one that is receiving increasing attention.
Research efforts into cyber warfare are extensive, covering a
range of issues such as legality, cyber weapons and deterrence.
Despite all of the research activity around cyber warfare, one
aspect has been largely overlooked: the restoration of peace
and security in its aftermath. In this article, we present the
argument that cyber warfare will threaten civilian peace and
security long after a conflict has ended, and that existing peace
operations will be required to evolve in order to address this
threat. We explore how existing UN peacekeeping operations
could be adapted, in ways that would be both feasible and
valuable towards maintaining and restoring peace in a region.
We conclude that the path to cyber peacekeeping will not be
easy, but that it is an evolution that must begin today so that we
can be prepared for the conflicts of the future.
Index Terms—Cyber Peacekeeping, Cyber Warfare, Cyber
Peace, Cyber Peace Operations
I. INTRODUCTION
THE topic of cyber warfare continues to receive a greatdeal of coverage in the media [1], [2], [3], on the
political stage [4], [5] and in academia [6], [7]. The research
community has responded to the rise of cyber warfare by
taking on some of the most pressing and immediate challenges
that the topic presents: the legality, ethics and doctrine of
cyber warfare have all been debated in great detail, along with
other important topics [8]. While research into cyber warfare
is clearly extensive, there remains an area where research is
lacking: how do we restore peace in the aftermath of cyber
warfare? We address this question by considering the concept
of cyber peacekeeping.
Section II sets out the background to the topic. We begin
by discussing what is meant by the term peacekeeping and
adopt the UN definition. We ask the question of whether cyber
peacekeeping is necessary, analysing arguments both for and
against its existence. Previous work on the topic is discussed
and definitions of both cyber peacekeeping and cyber peace-
keepers are proposed. We then examine each existing UN
peacekeeping activity for both value and feasibility in a post-
cyber warfare context. The article concludes with directions
for future research and the conclusions of our research.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to consider cyber peacekeeping, we must first be
clear what is meant by both cyber warfare and peacekeeping.
M. Robinson is with Airbus, Newport, United Kingdom
(michael.mi.robinson@airbus.com)
K. Jones is with Airbus, Newport, United Kingdom
(kevin.jones@airbus.com)
H. Janicke is with the Software Technology Research Laboratory, De
Montfort University, Leicester, United Kingdom (heljanic@dmu.ac.uk)
L. Maglaras is with the Software Technology Research Laboratory, De
Montfort University, Leicester, United Kingdom (leandrosmag@gmail.com)
A. Cyber Warfare
Cyber warfare is a vast area of research, with a number of
fields of study. Research topics can range from the ethical con-
siderations of cyber warfare [9] to how cyber weapons could
be developed and used [10]. There is however little consensus
regarding many aspects of cyber warfare, including how it
should be defined [8]. Despite this lack of understanding, a
number of national militaries now regard cyber space as a
warfighting domain, and have developed doctrines for fighting
within it [11], [12]. This lack of understanding combined
with increasing state level tensions over cyber conflict [13]
are a concerning situation: we are pioneers in a new and
untested form of conflict where the boundaries are unknown,
international law is yet to develop and attribution for actions
is difficult.
Although we have not reached international consensus on
how cyber warfare should be defined, it is necessary to adopt
a definition prior to considering a concept such as cyber
peacekeeping. Therefore, where the terms cyber attack, cyber
war and cyber warfare are used in this article, the definitions
proposed by Robinson et al. [8] are adopted. These definitions
are as follows:
• Cyber Attack: An act in cyber space that could reasonably
be expected to cause harm.
• Cyber Warfare: The use of cyber attacks with a warfare-
like intent.
• Cyber War: Occurs when a nation state declares war, and
where only cyber warfare is used to fight that war.
B. Peacekeeping
The term peacekeeping is defined by the Oxford English
Dictionary as “The active maintenance of a truce between
nations or communities, especially by an international military
force” [14], but many definitions exist with little international
agreement on which is correct [15].
We therefore adopt the definition used by one particular
organisation: The United Nations (UN). Arguably the most
high profile peacekeeping organisation of today, the UN re-
ceives extensive media coverage which exposes their work to
the public [16], [17]. The UN definition of peacekeeping is
as follows: “Action undertaken to preserve peace, however
fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in im-
plementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers” [18].
While we have picked UN peacekeeping as our focus, it must
be noted that many other organisations perform peacekeeping.
The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) is one such
example of a non-UN organisation whose stated aim is to
undertake peacekeeping responsibilities in the Sinai [19].
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C. UN Peacekeeping
To understand UN peacekeeping today, we must have an
understanding of its origins and history. UN peacekeeping
was developed as a means for the UN to meet one of its
core purposes as defined in the UN Charter: to maintain
international peace and security.
The first United Nations peacekeeping operation was formed
in 1948, in response to concern over hostilities in the Middle
East. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
(UNTSO) was dispatched as an unarmed monitoring mission
to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel, Egypt,
Lebanon, Jordan and Syria [20]. Throughout the 1960s and
70s, the UN continued to dispatch small scale peacekeeping
operations, helping to monitor ceasefires and uphold peace in
post conflict environments.
Into the 1980s, the ambition of UN peacekeeping continued
to grow both in scope and numbers. New operations went
beyond the traditional peacekeeping tasks seen previously,
expanding in scope to include more complex goals such as
the supervision of elections, providing humanitarian support
and building democratic institutions.
While earlier operations were generally regarded as success-
ful, it was during this period that the UN started to encounter
high profile failures. The Bosnian War of 1992 and the UN
Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) in 1993 are both
regarded as failings in UN peacekeeping [21]. In Somalia,
UN peacekeeping troops effectively became a participant in
the conflict rather than acting as peacekeepers. In Bosnia, UN
peacekeepers failed to prevent ethnic cleansing and ensure the
protection of civilians. The Dutch state was later found liable
for 300 deaths, with The Hague district court ruling that Dutch
peacekeepers did not do enough to ensure their protection [22].
Similarly in the high profile case of Rwanda (1994), UN
peacekeepers failed to protect civilians from harm [23].
These failures led the UN to re-evaluate its approach to
peacekeeping [24], and a number of reforms were recom-
mended [25]. This resulted in the realisation that peacekeeping
was not a magic wand. It had limitations and was only
appropriate when specific criteria were met.
Today, UN peacekeeping still faces multiple challenges.
As an example, MONUSCO is the most expensive ongoing
peacekeeping operation in history. Aimed at restoring peace
in the DR Congo, it was established in 1999 and is still ongo-
ing today (October 2017) with 22,000 uniformed personnel
deployed in the region and a budget of just over $1b per
year. Despite the long involvement of peacekeeping forces and
some important successes such as the holding of free and fair
elections in 2006, fighting between combatants and attacks on
civilians continues and there is little sign of long term peace.
Other problems facing UN peacekeeping include a constant
struggle to secure troop and police contributions, weak support
from the international community and the internal challenge
of running such a huge organisation effectively.
D. UN Peacekeeping Goals
The UN defines two type of peacekeeping operation that it
can undertake: Traditional and Multi-Dimensional.
• Traditional: Operations which adhere strictly to the
traditional goals of observation, monitoring and reporting.
• Multi-Dimensional: More complex operations which in-
clude peacekeeping but also extend into peace building
e.g. reforming a state’s security sector and clearing mines.
E. Peacekeeping amongst other activities
Whilst this article is focused upon cyber peacekeeping, it
is important to note that peacekeeping is an activity which
overlaps with a wider set of peace operations. According to
the UN, these other activities are:
• Conflict Prevention: Early intervention to prevent a
dispute escalating.
• Peacemaking: Diplomatic measures aimed at bringing
about a ceasefire.
• Peace Enforcement: Restoring peace without consent of
the parties.
• Peace Building: Laying the foundation for long term
peace and preventing relapse into conflict.
These activities and their relationship to peacekeeping are
shown in figure 1.
Fig. 1. UN Peace Activities [18]
The overlap between each of the activities is clear; Peace-
keeping operations cannot be viewed in isolation, and peace-
keepers are often called upon to assist in peacemaking and
peace building where necessary.
F. UN Peacekeeping Principles
UN Peacekeeping has always been guided by a number
of core principles, further refined following the Brahimi re-
port [25]. Today, these core principles are as follows:
• Consent of the parties: Peacekeeping operations are only
deployed with the consent of the conflicting parties. This
gives the operation the legitimacy to act both physically
and politically in the area. Without consent of all parties,
the operation risks becoming involved in the conflict.
• Impartiality: Operations maintain peace without favour-
ing any of the involved parties. An operation must be seen
as impartial to remain legitimate. Following the Brahimi
report, it was clarified that impartiality does not mean
inaction in the face of clear threats to peace.
• Non use of force, except in self defence and defence of
the mandate: Use of force should be a measure of last
resort. Following the Brahimi report, it was made clear
that force could be used in defence of the mandate. This
highlighted that force could be used against those who
were determined to undermine the peace process.
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With this understanding of UN peacekeeping’s history, pur-
pose and principles, we are better equipped to begin exploring
the concept of cyber peacekeeping. The following section
begins this process, by surveying existing works on the topic.
III. EXISTING RESEARCH
One of the earliest explorations into the concept of cyber
peacekeeping came from Cahill et al. [26], who identified cy-
ber peacekeeping as a future area of research. They examined
existing UN peacekeeping principles and made proposals on
how they could be applied to the cyber domain. The work by
Cahill et al. is valuable in that it made the first steps towards
identifying cyber peacekeeping as a novel area of research,
and followed a logical approach towards proposing the six
principles. While their work lays good foundations for thinking
about cyber peacekeeping, the authors did not publish further
work to expand upon their proposals. This is a problem, since
there are significant questions regarding how each principle
could be implemented at a practical level.
Research by Kleffner and Dinniss [27] concurs that future
conflict will contain cyber elements, and that peacekeepers
will increasingly find themselves on missions in which cyber
incidents will occur during, following or even in the absence
of, conventional hostilities. Their focus was to examine cyber
peacekeeping from a legality perspective and they state that the
UN Security Council would be legally entitled to determine
that cyber warfare could amount to a threat to international
peace and security under Article 39 of the UN Charter. They
conclude that cyber peacekeeping will largely be legally per-
missible, with international human rights law and the specifics
of the mandate for a particular operation being the primary
legal framework to guide it.
The most recent work regarding cyber peacekeeping was
contributed by Akatyev and James [28] . They propose that cy-
ber peacekeeping has a role during all three stages of a conflict:
pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict. In the pre-conflict stage,
cyber peacekeepers will conduct activities to maintain and
enhance international peace. For example, working to develop
international norms and contributing to research and devel-
opment. During the conflict stage, the tasks change. Cyber
peacekeepers now work to detect attacks and minimise their
impact on civilians while assisting nations in keeping critical
infrastructure operational. In the post conflict stage, they work
to help states develop countermeasures to the cyber weapons
used in the conflict, while also assisting nations in rebuilding
their defences. They describe two practical implementations
of cyber peacekeeping - a Rapid Response Division (RRD)
and a Long Term Stability and Relief Division (LSRD). The
focus of the RRD is primarily to protect what they term the
cyberspace safe layer. This is defined as being a nations pre-
identified, minimally-required critical infrastructure necessary
for civilian safety. In the case of cyber conflict, the RRD will
therefore take immediate measures to protect and ensure the
availability of this safe layer. The LSRD takes a longer term
approach, working to build capacity and defences to ensure
a longer lasting peace. Akatyev and James followed up their
research in 2017[29], by proposing how their system could
fit into new schemes such as the UNs digital blue helmet
programme.
IV. THE NEED FOR CYBER PEACEKEEPING
The use of the cyber domain is a relatively new aspect of
war [8], and the world has yet to see a war in which cyber
warfare has played a significant part. We must therefore ask
the question: is cyber peacekeeping necessary?
As a starting point, let us consider why any form of UN
peacekeeping is needed. Chapter I of the UN Charter [30]
defines the core objectives of the UN, one of which is
to maintain international peace and security. Peacekeeping
operations are the practical measure through which the UN
fulfils this mandate, and is the most common justification for
forming a peacekeeping operation [15]. If cyber warfare could
threaten international peace and security, it follows that the UN
would be required to conduct peacekeeping in response to it.
We must therefore consider if cyber warfare could realistically
threaten international peace and security. The answer to this
depends upon how the term is defined. When the term was
originally used in the UN Charter, it was envisioned that
most cases would arise out of inter-state conflict [15]. Over
the years however, the UN has widened the scope to include
events such as state collapse, HIV/AIDS, nuclear proliferation,
humanitarian suffering and massive human rights abuses. In
effect, the UN Security Council has a large degree of discretion
on what constitutes a threat to international peace and security.
If events such as state collapse, humanitarian suffering and
human rights abuses are threats to international peace and
security, it is an indicator that cyber peacekeeping will be nec-
essary. Cyber attacks can initiate, compound or prolong such
events. For example, cyber attacks could at least contribute
towards the collapse of a state if they initiate or prolong the
failure of critical national infrastructure. Nations are becoming
reliant on the cyber domain to provide services that keep a
nation running: power grids, water supplies, communications,
transportation and finance are all increasingly becoming cyber
dependant [31]. Cyber warfare which causes blackouts, cuts
off supplies to safe drinking water, makes travelling dangerous
or destabilises a national economy is clearly a threat to the
stability of a nation and is therefore a threat to international
peace and security, providing justification for the establishment
of a peacekeeping operation.
A similar argument can be made for human rights violations.
At the most critical end of the spectrum, a national blackout
or toxic water supply has the potential to threaten the right to
life. Less grave but still important is the right of every person
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through
any media and regardless of frontiers [32]. As an example,
when the Cameroon government cut off internet access to
predominantly English speaking parts of the country, the UN
stated that it was “an appalling violation of their right to
freedom of expression” [33]. This evidences the fact that the
UN believes human rights can be threatened in the cyber
domain and therefore adds weight to the argument that cyber
could amount to a threat to international peace and security.
We must also consider softer forms of cyber warfare such as
election hacking as a justification for cyber peacekeeping. Free
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and fair elections are an essential ingredient towards peace in a
nation [34]: any doubt over the legitimacy of an election result
can damage a peace process and precipitate to a relapse into
conflict. Alleged targeting of elections and political systems
by cyber means is becoming more common, with extensive
media coverage over possible Russian influence on the 2016
US presidential election [35]. Similarly, a 2017 cyber attack on
Emmanuel Macron’s party in France was described as a clear
attempt to destabilise the election and democratic process [36].
These attacks were upon nations which are stable enough to
withstand them. However, in smaller nations recovering from
conflict where peace is fragile, similar doubt upon election
legitimacy could be enough to derail the peace process.
Looking to existing literature, opinion is divided. Kleffner
and Dinniss [27] have suggested that cyber peacekeeping will
become a necessity, predicting that peacekeepers will find
themselves having to operate inside of the cyber domain
in order to maintain peace in future conflicts. Akatyev and
James [28] agree, stating that cyber peacekeeping is needed
to protect an increasingly-connected number of people, to help
prevent escalation of cyber conflicts, to provide arbitration
among states, and to help build and maintain trust in cy-
berspace. John Bumgarner, Chief Technology Officer at the
U.S. Cyber Consequences adds weight to the argument for
cyber peacekeeping by stating that “the UN needs to figure out
how they can deploy peace keepers in the digital borders of a
nation, virtual peacekeepers that would protect the peace” [37].
On the opposing side of the debate, others have argued that
cyber peacekeeping is not necessary since it is both premature
and redundant [38]. The premature argument proposes that
until cyber warfare is better understood and more of a direct
threat to society, attempts to design cyber peacekeeping are
premature: we simply do not understand the threats and how
to counter them effectively. This view can be challenged
however, with a counter argument that cyber peacekeeping is
necessary because cyber warfare is not fully understood [8].
As nations begin to use the cyber domain during warfare,
unregulated, untested and experimental forms of cyber attack
have the potential to unintentionally inflict indiscriminate,
disproportionate and prolonged suffering to civilians. This
clearly presents a threat to international peace and security
through human rights violations and state collapse.
A further lens through which a need for cyber peacekeeping
can be considered is the concept of responsibility to protect
(R2P). R2P is an international agreement that all states have a
responsibility to protect civilians from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and was agreed
upon unanimously by world leaders in 2005 [39]. Although
R2P can be used as a justification for peacekeeping, its
justification for cyber peacekeeping is questionable. While
cyber warfare can target critical infrastructure and result in
harm to civilians, it is questionable whether this activity would
rise to the level of a war crime or genocide. However, in the
case of attacks on civilian air traffic control, water supplies,
or dams the potential for indiscriminate and mass civilian
casualties is high. Therefore the potential for war crimes via
cyber warfare and the relevance of R2P cannot be entirely
dismissed.
When considering a political construct such as peacekeep-
ing, it is also necessary to consider political views in relation
to whether cyber peacekeeping is needed. For example, the
Westphalian school of thought believes that the world consists
of sovereign states who recognise no higher authority. Other
states and organisations should not interfere with issues inside
of that state unless invited [15]. If approached from this
perspective, cyber peacekeeping is harder to justify, but still
possible when full consent from both parties is given - a core
principle of UN peacekeeping.
In summary, while there are arguments both for and against
the need for cyber peacekeeping, the balance of arguments
favour cyber peacekeeping becoming necessary in the future.
These are summarised into three points:
1. Cyber warfare is new and untested, raising the like-
lihood that it could unintentionally lead to indiscriminate,
disproportionate and prolonged suffering to civilians, even
after a conflict has ended. 2. Cyber warfare could threaten
international peace and security in a variety of ways, satisfying
the UN Charters own requirements for the establishment of a
peacekeeping operation. 3. Some cyber warfare might rise to a
level which exceeds the thresholds of responsibility to protect
(R2P).
V. DEFINING CYBER PEACEKEEPING
We have put forward the argument that cyber peacekeeping
will become necessary in the future, and it is now important
to define what is meant by cyber peacekeeping. This is not a
simple task, since the question of how to define peacekeeping
even in its current form is a source of continual debate [15].
To simplify the task, we adopt the UN definition:
“Action undertaken to preserve peace, however frag-
ile, where fighting has been halted and to assist
in implementing agreements achieved by the peace-
makers.” [40]
As a first step towards finding a definition, the original can
be modified to focus it around cyber space:
“Action undertaken in cyberspace to preserve peace,
however fragile, where fighting has been halted and
to assist in implementing agreements achieved by
the peacemakers.”
The primary strength of this definition is that it is built
upon wording that is already established in the international
community. A potential weakness is that requiring an action
be performed in cyberspace to count as cyber peacekeeping
means that activities which require cyber knowledge but are
kinetic in nature (such as training or assisting with policy
reforms) cannot be regarded as cyber peacekeeping. To address
this weakness, an alternative definition can be considered:
Cyber related action undertaken to preserve peace,
however fragile, where fighting has been halted and
to assist in implementing agreements achieved by
the peacemakers.
This definition removes the requirement that the action
must be in cyber space, but to determine which definition
is correct an important question must be asked: should the
test for whether an action is cyber peacekeeping be the type
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of knowledge being used or the actual domain it is being
performed in? For assistance here, we can study a similar
case where peacekeeping has been applied to a particular
domain of war: peacekeeping in the maritime domain. The
UN Peacekeeping Missions Military Maritime Task Force
Manual [41] states the following:
“The Maritime Task Force is not limited to maritime
effects at sea. Its ships provide advanced platforms
for military aviation, communications and medical
support to the ground force. These maritime capa-
bilities strengthen the Force Commander’s capabil-
ity with enhanced deterrence, situational awareness,
medical facilities and military transportation sustain-
ing operations and the execution of mandated tasks
on shore and afloat.” [41]
This suggests that a naval task force dispatched to conduct
“maritime peacekeeping” is not confined to conducting tasks
at sea. The reference to maritime capabilities being used to
strengthen the operation suggests that naval peacekeeping is
defined by the application of a maritime capability, rather
than the action being confined to any specific domain. This
proposal is supported further by the manual, which goes on to
describe training in areas such as maritime law and policy as
being a task of the maritime task force. It is therefore argued
that if maritime peacekeeping is the application of maritime
capability in any domain, it follows that cyber peacekeeping
should be the application of cyber capability in any domain.
The definition can therefore be refined as follows:
Definition 1. UN Cyber Peacekeeping. The application of
cyber capability to preserve peace, however fragile, where
fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agree-
ments achieved by the peacemakers.
For completeness, it is also necessary to define the term
cyber peacekeeper. The term ‘peacekeepers’ has been de-
fined as “individuals and groups who perform peacekeeping
activities” [15]. This is a broad definition, and therefore
includes civilians, armed forces, charities, governmental and
non-governmental organisations. The UN does not provide
a definition of a peacekeeper. Whether the term refers to
uniformed blue helmets, or to all people involved in a UN
peacekeeping operation such as civilian staff, volunteers and
partner organisations remains unclear. We adapt the definition
offered by Bellamy and Williams [15] as follows:
Definition 2. Cyber Peacekeeper. An individual performing
cyber peacekeeping activities.
VI. METHODOLOGY
We identified two potential approaches towards developing
the activity of cyber peacekeeping. Firstly, it could be designed
as a unique concept with a set of activities drawn up from
scratch. Secondly, we could examine existing UN peacekeep-
ing activities and explore how they could be adapted to bring
value in a post-cyber warfare context. We propose that the
latter approach brings a number of benefits:
• Adoption: When cyber peacekeeping can be shown to fit
alongside established peacekeeping norms, peacekeeping
organisations will be more likely to understand the value
and carry it forward into the field.
• Comprehensive: Peacekeeping activities have been de-
veloped over decades, in response to practical experience
in the field. By adapting existing activities, it is more
likely that cyber peacekeeping will address the issues that
are significant to peacekeeping operations.
• Integration: By sharing a common approach, cyber
peacekeeping has the flexibility to either operate as a stan-
dalone event, or alongside kinetic peacekeeping as part of
a wider operation. Cyber peacekeepers can be smoothly
integrated into existing processes, where overlap with the
other domains will be common.
Taking this approach, we adopt the following methodology
in this article:
1) Each existing UN peacekeeping activity is presented,
and the value that it brings towards maintaining peace
identified.
2) We consider how this value could be maintained if the
activity was performed in relation to cyber warfare. If no
value can be identified, even by adapting the activity, it
should not be included as part of cyber peacekeeping.
3) If some value can be maintained, we will explore how
feasible the activity would be to perform in a cyber
warfare context. Where obstacles are expected, these will
be discussed.
4) The expected result is the proposal of a collection of
cyber peacekeeping activities which are familiar to peace-
keeping organisations, feasible to perform and valuable
towards maintaining international peace and security.
UN peacekeeping literature [18] indicates that there are
broadly eleven distinct activities that are performed in a UN
peacekeeping operation. These are shown in figure 2.
In line with our methodology, we now examine each activity
and identify how each one brings value towards maintaining
peace and security. We consider ways in which that value could
be transferred to a post-cyber warfare context. If value can be
found, we then consider how feasible it would be and discuss
any challenges that might arise.
VII. OBSERVATION, MONITORING AND REPORTING
Observation, Monitoring and Reporting (OMR) is one of the
core activities performed during a UN peacekeeping operation.
The activity brings value by providing impartial reporting
on adherence to ceasefire agreements, violations of human
rights and other information where trust in its correctness is
critical towards maintaining peace. OMR can be a specific
task, such as a foot patrol around a specific area or by the
dispatch of unarmed UN Military Observers (UNMOs). It is
also an incidental task, performed by peacekeeping staff who
observe and report issues during the course of their other
peacekeeping duties. UN Infantry Battalion Manuals Volumes
One and Two [42], [43] specify three observational goals of
OMR. UN personnel aim to observe, monitor and report upon:
1) Actions which violate peace agreements.
2) Human rights abuses.
3) Changes in terrain, dispositions and civilian activity.
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Fig. 2. Activities undertaken by kinetic UN peacekeeping operations as defined by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)
When considering how OMR could apply to the cyber
domain, an immediate point of note is that the concept of
observation, monitoring and reporting in cyberspace is not
new. Cyber attacks against businesses and governments have
encouraged research into how observation, monitoring and
reporting in cyberspace can be improved [44], [45]. Books by
authors such as Bejtlich [46], [47] and Murdoch [48] provide
advice on best practice regarding network monitoring and
reporting, and certifications such as the Cisco cybersecurity
specialist certification [49] are designed to give cyber security
professionals the skills needed to effectively observe and
monitor in the cyber domain. It is therefore true that many of
the existing techniques of monitoring in cyberspace will likely
be used by cyber peacekeepers. The focus of this section is
therefore not to discuss how cyberspace can be monitored and
observed, since this is an already established field of study. The
focus is to explore how existing cyber observation methods
could be used to fulfil the three OMR observational goals. We
begin by examining the first goal.
A. Actions which violate peace agreements
The monitoring and reporting of actions which violate peace
agreements brings value towards maintaining peace, since the
reports will be coming from a trusted third party which is unbi-
ased towards any particular side to the conflict. This means that
the information reported by UN peacekeepers can be regarded
as true and fair, removing doubt and potential accusations of
false reporting. While clearly valuable in relation to kinetic
warfare, can this value be maintained when applied to cyber
warfare?
It has been stated that wars of the future will contain
elements of cyber warfare [8]. If this is true, it follows that
future peace agreements will likely contain terms relating to
cyber warfare. At the very least, it is reasonable to expect
a peace agreement to state that cyber attacks should cease.
If cyber peacekeeping can monitor and report on violations
of these terms in an unbiased and fair manner, then value
can be found. For example, if country A agrees not to attack
country B’s power grid, UN cyber peacekeeper monitoring
would be valuable in acting as a trusted third party to monitor
for adherence to that agreement. It is therefore prudent to
explore whether it would be feasible to perform.
From the perspective of technical feasibility, a basic moni-
toring capability is feasible to establish using existing knowl-
edge of cyber security practices, but significant challenges
exist. Firstly, caution must be used when the cyber terms are
agreed. Stating that country A will cease all cyber attacks
upon country B is one that will be difficult to monitor. Asking
any organisation to monitor every network in a nation is
unrealistic: it would simply require an amount of resources
(both human and hardware) that would be infeasible to provide
in the context of a peacekeeping operation. It is therefore
envisioned that peace agreements must list specific networks
that should not be attacked. The idea of a cyberspace safe
layer as described by Akatyev and James [28] would fit
this requirement, whereby a minimal set of critical systems
that should be observed are identified. Arguably the most
significant technical obstacle is the attribution problem. While
it will be possible to observe an attack on a network, it will
be difficult to prove where that attack originated. Figure 3
shows how an attack can be routed through multiple countries
and organisations, each with varying levels of cooperation
and political relations. This intentionally makes tracing the
attack to its real source difficult. Research into the attribu-
tion problem is ongoing [50], [51], [8], but as of today it
will remain an obstacle towards fulfilling this OMR goal in
cyber peacekeeping. Statements from UN peacekeepers that
a particular party has violated a peace agreement comes with
significant implications towards peace and security in a region.
If solid, evidenced attribution cannot support such a statement
without dispute, the feasibility of reaching this particular
OMR goal is reduced. The nature of cyber peacekeeping does
present a potentially novel solution however. As Wheeler and
Larsen [51] noted, prepositioning of trust is an essential part
of solving the attribution problem. Cyber peacekeeping has
the potential to enable this prepositioning in the form of what
we call cyber peacekeeper reservists. These are people who
work at backbone providers and telecoms organisations, who
are able to activate when required and cooperate to perform
tracebacks across organisational and political boundaries. This
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Fig. 3. The traceback problem: Country A and B are friendly, whilst Country C will not cooperate
potential should be explored as part of future work. At this
stage, it is concluded that while the value of monitoring for
actions which violate peace agreements would be high, the
feasibility of doing so in the cyber domain is currently low,
primarily due to the attribution problem.
B. Human rights abuses
Human rights is an issue that has always been at the core of
peacekeeping, and monitoring for abuses of people’s human
rights is therefore the second observational goal of OMR. The
value this brings to peace and security is clear: the universal
declaration of human rights [32] is an internationally recog-
nised document which sets out the basic rights of all humans,
respect of which are essential in fostering peace. To determine
if this value can be transferred into cyber peacekeeping, we
must consider if human rights can be threatened or violated
in the cyber domain.
The answer to this question forms a separate and broad
research area, and is actively being explored by many authors.
For example, Klang and Murray note that it is difficult to
define how human rights relate to the growing use of cy-
berspace [52] whilst others such as Kulesza and Balleste [53]
have focused on cyberspace’s impact on the human right to
privacy.
Human rights specifically in relation to cyber warfare is
less well studied. Upon inspection of the rights laid out in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), we propose
that three are particularly vulnerable to cyber warfare. These
are shown in figure 4.
Observing for threats towards life, liberty and security of
person (Article 3) would be highly valuable in relation to cyber
warfare. Cyber attacks upon critical infrastructure such as
public water supplies, the power grid or air traffic control have
potential to threaten civilian life and security. This would also
be feasible to perform, since it does not rely upon attribution
(cyber peacekeepers need only detect a threat to civilian life
and provide warning, not attribute it to a particular party).
Observing for violations of privacy (Article 12) could also
be threatened by cyber warfare. Cyber weapons may expose
the personal data or private communications of civilians and
Fig. 4. Universal human rights at risk from the cyber domain
detecting such violations would be valuable towards main-
taining peace. However, there are some feasibility challenges
here. Snooping upon network traffic is fundamentally a passive
activity which is difficult to detect technically. For exam-
ple, a government may inspect all traffic passing through a
government controlled ISP, or compel regional technology
firms to provide access to private customer data such as
emails. These are examples of human rights violations that
are difficult to detect with a technical solution. The political
feasibility of observing for article 12 violations will also
present a challenge. We must remember that one of the core
UN peacekeeping principles is that of consent. This consent
may be jeopardised if the host nation suspects that cyber
peacekeepers are seeking to uncover government led privacy
violations. In this scenario, cyber peacekeepers may find it
preferable to not observe for privacy violations in favour of
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maintaining the operation and hence the ability to detect more
serious human rights violations such as article 3.
Monitoring for violations of freedom of expression and
access to information (Article 19) would also be valuable
towards maintaining peace. If civilians can access multiple
international news sources, they are less likely to be influ-
enced by local propaganda and misinformation. Furthermore,
the ability to impart information regardless of frontiers may
allow the international community to be alerted to violations
happening locally. A scenario can be envisioned whereby a
nation blocks citizen access to certain information or denies
internet access to people with certain views. This is an area
where the UN has already expressed an interest. In 2016 UN
special rapporteur David Kaye criticised Turkey’s “vast wave
of internet shutdowns and content takedowns” in the wake of
the attempted July coup [54].
Technically, if a cyber peacekeeping unit can secure ac-
cess into a national internet service provider (ISP), there is
potential to observe and report upon content blocking and
other restrictions to access. However, political feasibility may
again present an obstacle due to the principle of consent.
Cyber peacekeepers must consider if consent for their oper-
ation would be maintained, if it is suspected that the cyber
peacekeepers would be aiming to criticise the activities of
the consenting government. Political feasibility is therefore
questionable.
In addition to the rights set out in the UDHR, there are
efforts to develop a set of cyberspace human rights [55] which
aim to secure a new set of rights such as a right to access.
Should the world adopt such a set of rights, it is arguable that
cyber peacekeepers would have a mandate to protect them.
Until such rights are agreed upon, it is difficult to predict their
value and feasibility.
In summary, the value of monitoring for violations of human
rights can be applied to a post-cyber warfare context. We
propose that the highest value will come from observing
for threats to the right to life (article 3). The feasibility of
observing for violations will vary. Monitoring for privacy
violations is expected to be difficult, both for technical and
political reasons. Monitoring for violations of the right to
seek and impart information will be similarly challenging.
Monitoring for threats to life will be more feasible, providing
the necessary consent from the host nation can be secured.
C. Changes in terrain, dispositions and civilian activity
The final observational goal of OMR is to monitor and re-
port upon changes in terrain, dispositions of forces and civilian
activity. This brings value towards the peacekeeping operation
since it maintains situational awareness of the region. Jeannot,
Kelly and Thompson define situational awareness as ”knowing
what is going on around you” [56]. A more detailed definition
was given by Dominguez et al, who stated that situational
awareness involved four specific steps: [57]
1) Extracting information from the environment;
2) Integrating this information with relevant internal knowl-
edge to create a mental picture of the current situation;
3) Using this picture to direct further perceptual exploration
in a continual perceptual cycle; and
4) Anticipating future events.
Linking this back to peacekeeping, situational awareness
helps to inform all aspects of the operation e.g. how patrols
should geographically distributed, and highlight potential hot
spots for future conflict. In this regard, the value is really
one that is indirect towards maintaining peace: it enables
peacekeepers to operate more effectively, enhancing the value
of other activities they perform. This ”indirect” value can be
applied to a cyber warfare context, but some translation effort
is necessary.
To begin, observing for changes in ‘terrain’ does not make
sense in the cyber domain, since it is a domain in which
terrain does not exist. It is therefore proposed that rather than
monitor for changes in terrain, cyber peacekeepers should
monitor for changes in network structure. As examples, the
sudden unavailability of servers or the addition of new devices
would be valuable changes to look for. It must be noted
however, that networks are naturally subject to change in
normal conditions: routing tables can change depending on
network conditions and servers can become unavailable for
patching and maintenance. It will therefore be essential that
cyber peacekeepers build up an understanding of what is
normal and what is abnormal, effectively conducting anomaly
detection upon the network they are monitoring. Just as with
monitoring for changes in terrain, the aim of monitoring
for changes in network structure is to improve situational
awareness.
Observing for changes in network structure is feasible, since
extensive literature already exists on how this can be achieved.
NIST [58] provides one such example, presenting guidance
regarding network discovery, port and service identification,
vulnerability scanning and wireless scanning. By conducting
activities such as these, cyber peacekeepers can gain a view
of the cyber ‘terrain’, observe for changes and hence maintain
situational awareness of their environment.
Observing for changes in dispositions allows peacekeepers
to monitor the location and make-up of military forces. A rise
or fall in troop numbers, or the movement of forces from one
area to another are examples of changes in dispositions. This
again brings value through raising situational awareness. As
with the monitoring of network structure, being able to monitor
dispositions of forces in cyber warfare would be valuable.
The feasibility of dispositions monitoring in the cyber
domain is questionable. The first obstacle is that observing
cyber weapons and cyber combatants is challenging. Cyber
weapons are still not fully understood or defined [8] and cyber
combatants do not have to physically relocate or group up
in order to launch effective attacks. The question of how to
monitor dispositions during cyber warfare could be an entirely
new research area. For the purposes of this article, a simple
approach to this question is to consider what kind of situational
awareness we hope to gain. We propose the following two
goals:
• Identifying potential flashpoints of cyber conflict - what
targets could a party be aiming to attack via cyber means?
• Identifying growth or decline in cyber warfare capability
- what capability does each party hold, are they becoming
more advanced?
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Potential flashpoints of cyber conflict could be identified
by observing for changes in cyber security dispositions. For
example, if cyber peacekeepers working in a nation witness a
government’s cyber security resources switching their attention
towards protecting its power grid, this is arguably a change
in dispositions which may indicate power systems as a point
of cyber conflict in the near future. The feasibility of this
monitoring is questionable however. While the movement of
kinetic troops and vehicles can be observed, cyber troops can
perform their duties at a variety of sites without physically
relocating.
To identify a growth or decline in cyber warfare capability,
cyber peacekeepers operating in a network could monitor and
report upon the sophistication of cyber security techniques
employed by local staff. For example, the arrival of new cyber
staff who are clearly more adept or observing more advanced
attacks upon the infrastructure they are monitoring. This would
be feasible to perform, but we must again raise the challenge
of attribution. Even if an advanced attack was detected, the
attribution problem would make any conclusion regarding the
cyber warfare capability of any particular group difficult.
Finally, the observation of civilian activity brings value as
an indicator of the level of peace and security felt by the
local population. Any change in the usual patterns of civilian
life may point towards a change in the local situation that is
worth investigating further. It is proposed that in the cyber
domain, this observational goal can be translated into changes
in network traffic. This would involve cyber peacekeepers
building a baseline for normal traffic and subsequently looking
for deviations from that baseline. This is a feasible observation
goal, since anomaly detection in network monitoring is an
established field of research [59], [60] with a number of
commercial products offering such a feature [61]. It would
also bring value to the peacekeeping process, by alerting to
potential malware infections, denial of service attacks, data
exfiltration and unauthorised access to peacekeeper protected
networks.
VIII. CEASE-FIRE SUPERVISION AND SUPPORTING
VERIFICATION MECHANISMS
Cease-fire agreements are an important milestone towards
ending a conflict and restoring peace. They contain the terms
agreed by each side, and can include any number of provisions.
For example, the 2015 Minsk agreements in Ukraine [62] set
out twelve provisions that each side agreed to abide by such as
the withdrawal of heavy weapons from certain areas, prisoner
releases and early local elections. There are three core goals
of a cease-fire agreement [63]:
1) Cessation of hostilities
2) Separation of forces
3) Monitoring and supervision
The value that ceasefires bring is clear. They deter parties
from returning to conflict, make clear the rights and obligations
of each group, create a sense of formal legal obligation and
engage the international community [63]. But it must be noted
that they do not automatically lead to peace. Forces at ground
level may continue to fight, and an element of mistrust often
exists between conflicting parties [64]. Peacekeepers help to
maintain a ceasefire by acting as a trusted third party and
verifying that each party is abiding by the agreed terms.
If future conflicts involve cyber warfare, it follows that
future ceasefire agreements will contain cyber related terms.
There has not yet been an example of a ceasefire agreement
which contains cyber terms, but using guidance from existing
documentation [63], [64] along with current knowledge of
cyber warfare [8] it is possible to theorise about examples:
• The cessation of all cyber attacks.
• Cessation of cyber attacks upon a specific infrastructure.
• Agreement to cooperate on cybercrime/spoiler attacks.
E.g. Each nation will pursue and prosecute lone
wolf/spoiler cyber attackers inside their borders.
• Declaration of information stolen during the conflict.
• Declaration of systems compromised and assistance with
returning control to rightful owners.
• Declaration of known vulnerabilities in opposing party’s
networks.
• Dismantlement of botnets.
• Remote disabling of malware (if possible) or assistance
in locating and removing malware.
The value of these example agreements towards maintaining
peace would be high. They would provide confidence building
in the peace process and expedite each party’s ability to bring
infrastructure back online and resume provision of essential
services for civilians. This has the potential to avoid state
collapse or human rights violations. The feasibility of verifying
compliance with them is debatable however. Regarding the
cessation of all cyber attacks for example, the attribution
problem again makes it difficult to conclusively determine
that a cyber attack came from a specific party. It may not be
possible to provide unequivocal proof that a particular attack
was conducted by a cease-fire signatory. In this regard, any
ceasefire term which relies upon attribution has low feasibility
in practice. This will be a major obstacle towards cyber warfare
ceasefire agreements.
If attribution is an obstacle, terms which do not rely upon
attribution are desirable. The dismantling of botnets which
are geographically located inside the cease-fire signatories
country is an example of this. This would be an activity
that shows a commitment to reducing the potential for future
cyber attacks originating from their region. It does not require
attribution; regardless of who is using the botnet, the action
of dismantling it removes it from use by anyone. This would
be valuable towards peace and security, since it would reduce
the opportunity for use in future conflict.
Regarding declarations of compromised systems and in-
formation stolen, cyber peacekeepers can work with both
sides to determine if such declarations appear to be true.
This will involve an element of cyber forensics, in order
to determine whether the declarations made align with the
available forensic evidence on breached networks. This kind
of activity highlights the supervision aspect: both sides may be
reluctant to discuss and share information about cyber issues
with each other, since this information may be used against
them should the conflict restart. By disclosing the information
to cyber peacekeepers, the information is kept with a secure
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and trusted third party for the purposes of restoring peace
only. It must be noted however, that by declaring to cyber
peacekeepers the attacks used and systems compromised, there
is a risk that a party would be giving up an advantage held over
their opponent since the cyber peacekeepers may subsequently
close vulnerabilities and remove any unauthorised control of
systems. In this regard there is a strong incentive to withhold
information, in case the conflict reignites. This incentive to
cheat is counter balanced against the potential for being
revealed as a cheat by cyber peacekeepers. For example, if a
nation does not declare that it has control of a nation’s water
supply and such control is discovered later, the nation will be
revealed as trying to cheat the peacekeeping process.
In summary, ceasefires containing cyber terms will become
part of our future, but we have identified significant obstacles
towards finding valuable and feasible ways of implementing
them. This challenge must be explored further in future work.
IX. INTERPOSITION AS A BUFFER ZONE
Interposition as a buffer zone (BZ) is the final ”traditional”
UN peacekeeping activity. The previous activity of OMR was
a passive one: peacekeepers observe and report violations but
do not interfere or become involved (except in the case of
clear human rights violations, as highlighted by the Brahimi
Report [25]). Interposition as a buffer zone places peacekeep-
ers into a more active role, whereby they not only observe
and report but also act to prevent and stop violations. The UN
defines a buffer zone as “an area established between belliger-
ents and civilians that is protected and monitored by battalion
peacekeeping forces and where disputing or belligerent forces
and attacks on each other and the civilian population have
been excluded” [42]. This definition highlights the two key
areas where a BZ brings value:
1) Attacks on each other are excluded.
2) Attacks against civilians are excluded.
In a post cyber warfare context, we propose that this value
can be preserved: the field of cyber security already has exten-
sive guidance and tools for preventing and neutralising cyber
attacks on a network. If a traditional BZ is a geographical
area protected and monitored by peacekeeping forces, a CBZ
would be an area of cyber space protected and monitored by
peacekeeping forces. Practically, this ”area of cyber space”
would be a specific network or site under the protection of
cyber peacekeeping forces. This can be formalised in the
following definition:
Definition 3. Cyber Buffer Zone. A network or site that is
protected and monitored by peacekeeping forces, where cyber
attacks have been excluded.
The significant question is how existing cyber security
knowledge can be applied to a peacekeeping context to bring
about the value of excluding cyber attacks. To assist with this,
we can examine how a traditional buffer zone operates.
To exclude attacks, a traditional BZ is designed to “maintain
a visible presence and dominate the BZ with robust force pro-
jection to preserve the sanctity of the buffer zone by preventing
any violation of ceasefire/peace agreement clauses” [43]. From
this, we can extract two distinct ways in which a traditional
BZ excludes attacks:
1) Creating a visible and dominant presence: The creation
of a visible presence acts as a first line of defence
through deterrence. If an area is visibly well protected
by peacekeeping forces, it acts as a deterrent to attackers
since the risk of being observed and intercepted are high.
2) Robust force projection: When deterrence fails, belliger-
ents may be tempted to commit a violation inside the
buffer zone. Peacekeepers inside the zone act robustly
to intercept violators and stop their actions with force if
necessary.
A. Deterrence
When considering the feasibility of a CBZ, it must be
asked whether a visible presence and the associated effect
of deterrence can be replicated. This is important, since the
deterrence effect of a BZ forms part of the value that it brings
to maintaining peace and security. A significant point to note
here, is that the issue of deterrence in cyber warfare is a
well researched area [65], [66], and there is ongoing debate
regarding its effectiveness and challenges. In a peacekeeping
context, it is proposed that a CBZ could feasibly present a
deterrent effect in the following ways:
1) Raising awareness through announcements that a partic-
ular site is now under cyber peacekeeping protection -
any attacks will be scrutinised and the risk of detection
increased.
2) Threat of enhanced trace-back - Using the concept of
cyber peacekeeper reservists based at backbone providers,
there is an increased likelihood that an attacker will be
identified and held accountable.
3) High risk of attack failure - A site protected by a CBZ
will be regarded as a hard target for attack, this will have
a deterrent effect since the risks (loss of a cyber weapon,
revealed as a ceasefire violator) outweigh the reward.
While not a visible presence in the traditional sense, these
aspects would arguably produce the same effect: to influence
the thought process of a potential attacker so that they decide
not to launch an attack. An alternative view is that they
also hold potential to have the opposite effect. For exam-
ple, a hacking group may see a UN protected network as
an enjoyable challenge. In this regard, a deterrent effect is
something that the UN must fight for and win at an early
stage. UN cyber peacekeeping must demonstrate that it can
use the cyber reservist scheme to successfully trace back
attacks and identify attackers, regardless of their geographical
location. Once this effectiveness is proven through high profile
successes, a deterrent effect will be established for future
operations. If a cyber peacekeeping unit fails to do so, the
deterrence effect is reduced and future CBZs will be less
effective.
B. Robust force projection
In the context of a CBZ, robust force projection will be
active measures taken by cyber peacekeepers to detect and
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neutralise cyber attacks in the network they are protecting.
This is largely the application of existing cyber security
knowledge. Cyber peacekeepers would work to secure the
network both in the short and long term. The ultimate aim
would be to strengthen cyber security and local skills to a
level where cyber peacekeepers could withdraw. A possible
list of activities are as follows:
• Dropping packets suspected of being cyber attacks.
• Blocking attacker IP ranges at network devices.
• Performing host hardening (patching, removing unneces-
sary services).
• Providing additional capacity to reduce impact of DoS
attacks.
• Providing training for local staff to enable eventual peace-
keeper withdrawal.
All of these activities should be feasible to perform, with
the aim of detecting and neutralising cyber attacks before they
can damage their intended target. A precise list of activities
can be explored as part of future work, and will likely vary
depending on the network to be protected. For example: a CBZ
at a nuclear power plant will implement different methods of
defence in comparison to a CBZ at a governmental office.
It is concluded that a cyber buffer zone would bring value
to the peacekeeping process by excluding cyber attacks upon
networks which are critical towards maintaining peace and
security. It is also a feasible activity, since it utilises existing
cyber security knowledge and tools to provide the buffer.
X. DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION AND
RE-INTEGRATION (DDR)
The UN defines DDR as an activity which “aims to deal
with the post-conflict security problem that arises when com-
batants are left without livelihoods and support networks” [67].
It is a process which identifies ex-combatants and assists them
in finding peaceful and sustainable civilian life. This is an
important activity, since those who have known nothing but
war may work against peace if they cannot sustain themselves
in a peaceful environment. Each of the three sub-activities -
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration will be exam-
ined to determine their potential value and feasibility in a cyber
context.
1) Disarmament: Disarming ex-combatants during peace-
keeping brings values in three ways. Firstly it is a symbolic
act, the giving up of weapons reinforcing the message to the
ex-combatant that the conflict is over. Secondly, it serves to
physically remove weapons from the region which reduces the
likelihood of a relapse into armed conflict. The final purpose
is to act as a confidence building measure. When civilians
and ex-combatants from both sides witness weapons being
surrendered, it provides reassurance that the peace process is
real and that it is progressing. When considering if this value
could be maintained in a post-cyber warfare context, three
potential approaches can be identified, summarised in figure 5.
The first approach is software disarmament, which aims
to remove software which could be used as a cyber weapon
such as hacking tools. This approach has a number of fea-
sibility issues however. Firstly, there is no widely accepted
Fig. 5. Three potential approaches to cyber disarmament
definition of a cyber weapon [68], [8]. Secondly, software
can have both peaceful and warfare uses [8], which makes
choosing which software to confiscate difficult. Thirdly, cyber
weapons have characteristics which kinetic weapons do not.
Fir example, ease of replication allows cyber weapons to be
acquired, passed on and proliferated at very little cost. If
confiscated software can simply be re-downloaded, it is never
truly removed. Software can also be easily hidden through the
use of encryption and remote storage (e.g. to cloud service).
These problems cause software disarmament to fail at the
intended goals: it will not reduce the number of weapons,
and subsequently not increase confidence because each party
will be aware of its weaknesses. Whether it can act as a
symbolic gesture is debatable. A cyber ex-combatant may find
some psychological benefit from surrendering hacking tools to
peacekeeping forces and is an aspect worth exploring in future
work. Despite the problems with software disarmament, there
are instances where it could be argued as having merit. For
example, if a party developed a cyber weapon using zero-day
exploits and kept strict controls over its replication, a software
disarmament process could arguably destroy all copies and
leave none behind. This argument has weaknesses however,
since the vulnerability (and knowledge of it) would still exist,
allowing the weapon to be recreated in the future.
The second approach is hardware disarmament, whereby
computing devices such as laptops, PCs and tablets are sur-
rendered. Without access to such devices, ex-combatants will
not be able to resume launching cyber attacks. A significant
feasibility problem with hardware disarmament is that the
confiscated hardware, like software, is dual use. A laptop
used for launching cyber attacks can also be used for social,
economic and educational purposes. Taking this hardware
away from an ex-combatant may actually harm the peace
process by removing devices that are needed to flourish in
a peaceful society. A further problem is that in wealthy
nations, removing hardware is barely more than a temporary
inconvenience. It must be concluded that this approach will
not fulfil the goals of disarmament.
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A third approach is viability disarmament. Here the focus is
shifted away from the attacker and towards the target. By hard-
ening targets and closing vulnerabilities, cyber weapons can
be “disarmed” remotely. This is an appealing approach, since
it avoids the problem of having to locate every copy of a cyber
weapon. This method exploits the fast life cycle characteristic
of cyber weapons [8]. Considering the disarmament goals,
this approach comes out favourably. It would not technically
reduce the number of cyber weapons in a region, but it would
reduce the effectiveness of those weapons on targets that are
essential to peace and security. It would also be a confidence
building measure, since both parties would understand that
making cyber weapons ineffective is a technical solution that
works. Regarding symbolism, viability disarmament requires
no voluntary surrendering of weapons and therefore this goal
is missed.
In summary, no single approach to cyber disarmament ap-
pears to fulfil all of the traditional goals. Viability disarmament
provides confidence building and contributes towards reducing
the number of effective weapons in the region. But this
approach lacks the symbolism of an ex-combatant voluntarily
surrendering their weapons. To achieve all of the goals of
disarmament, a combined approach is necessary. Viability dis-
armament alongside an encouragement to voluntarily surrender
software and tools is arguably the approach that would fulfil all
of the disarmament goals. This would be a feasible approach,
and also one that would bring value to the peacekeeping
process.
2) Demobilisation: Demobilisation is the physical and
mental process of taking a combatant and supporting them
in a transition back to civilian life. It is defined by the UN
as “the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants
from armed forces or other armed groups” [67]. There are
two overall goals of demobilisation. The first is the physical
goal of separating the combatant from their command and
control structure. This is followed by the mental goal of
changing their mindset from that of a combatant to that
of a civilian. Demobilisation is attractive to ex-combatants
due to the assistance they receive. In the short term this
assistance includes food, shelter, training, education and tools.
The value of performing demobilisation is that combatants
are guided through a process which helps to ensure that they
have peaceful ways of living and are not reliant on conflict
to maintain a livelihood. When considering if this value could
be maintained in cyber peacekeeping, it is necessary to ask
if cyber combatants require demobilisation. This is not a
simple question to answer, since there are generally two types
of combatants recognised by the DDR process - those from
armed forces (national militaries) and those from armed groups
(informal factions).
For both category of cyber ex combatant, it is proposed that
demobilisation would be valuable. Cyber combatants will have
a skillset which has the potential to damage the peace process.
For example, without a demobilisation process they may turn
to cyber crime in order to sustain themselves during peacetime.
Demobilising them can provide education on opportunities
that leverage their highly desirable skills for a peaceful and
sustainable purpose (e.g. cyber security roles).
In the case of cyber combatants from armed forces, this
is feasible to perform, since the cyber combatants will be
referred to the DDR process by their commander. Cyber
combatants from armed groups present more of a feasibility
challenge. Membership of armed groups may be informal,
without any written documentation or proof of membership,
making identification of members difficult. Armed groups
may also simply disband and mix in with civilian commu-
nities once hostilities have ended. The benefits that DDR
offers are designed to overcome this by encouraging self-
identification [67]. To ensure that DDR benefits are not being
claimed fraudulently, self identifiers are tested for knowledge
such as key battles and familiarity with weapons. Such tests
could be adapted for cyber by testing for detailed knowledge
of key cyber attacks: which vulnerabilities were used, which
systems were breached and so on.
Another feasibility issue with armed groups is that the
nature of cyber warfare allows for cyber combatants to be
physically located outside the conflict region. This problem
is unique to cyber peacekeeping, since kinetic combatants
must generally be physically present in a region to conduct
attacks. The closest guidance on this issue can be found in
the UN DDR Framework Module 5.40 [69]. This module
addresses the problem of foreign combatants crossing borders
to conduct warfare in other nations. The suggested solution
is to intern these combatants and return them to their country
of origin without offering any DDR services. If this guidance
is maintained into cyber peacekeeping, DDR should not be
offered to foreign cyber combatants. Another potential avenue
is to simply regard these people as outside spoilers: those not
involved in the peace process, e.g. disgruntled groups, citizens
and combatants [70]. If they are regarded as spoilers rather
than ex combatants, demobilisation is not provided. A counter
argument can be made however, in that providing DDR would
bring value if it meant that the cyber attacks ceased and future
cyber attacks from this person were avoided. Ultimately, the
feasibility of tracking down such people and the pressures on
funding are likely to result in this value being expensive to
realise.
In summary, demobilising cyber combatants would bring
value to a peace operation since it would guide cyber ex-
combatants away from cyber crime during peacetime. It is also
feasible to perform, since existing procedures can generally be
followed with some adaptations. Future work should explore
how this activity could be developed even further.
3) Reintegration: Demobilisation is a short term process,
and is followed by the longer term process of reintegration.
It is formally defined as “the process by which ex-combatants
acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and
income” [67]. The value of reintegration as an activity is clear.
It provides life skills, vocational training, education and on
the job training to ex-combatants who have potentially little
experience of living outside of conflict and war.
When considering if reintegration would bring value for
cyber ex-combatants, a number of points must be considered.
Firstly a cyber ex-combatant may already be integrated with
society, holding employment that they can return to. As
an example, a cyber security professional may have been
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conscripted to fight for the government and can now return
to their previous employment. In this regard, the reintegration
process will either be not required or be very brief. Others may
be on the opposite end of the scale and truly lack knowledge on
how their skills could be applied to civilian life. An example
here is a teenage cyber combatant who has never held legal
employment and would struggle to transfer their skills without
some support. Reintegration would be valuable here.
Performing reintegration with cyber ex-combatants is feasi-
ble. Programmes can be developed that help ex-combatants
capitalise on existing cyber skills and help to guide them
into a sustainable livelihood. In particular, there are natural
links that exist between the DDR process and the Security
Sector Reform (SSR) process [71]. As national police and
security sectors are reformed, ex-cyber combatants are in a
position to fill roles aimed at bolstering the cyber defence of
the nation and to receive on the job training and development.
A model such as the Estonian Defence League is a good
example of what is possible [72]. Private industry also has
an incentive to actively take part in such reintegration efforts,
since they will directly benefit from access to highly desired
cyber security skills. In conclusion, reintegration is expected
to be both valuable and feasible.
XI. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM (SSR)
Security Sector Reform (SSR) aims to leave a nation with
a capable and suitable security sector. The UN gives SSR
the following definition: “a process of assessment, review
and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led
by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement
of effective and accountable security for the State and its
peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human
rights and the rule of law” [73]. A nation’s security sector
includes defence, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence
services, border management, customs and judicial systems.
The types of reform these institutions require after a conflict
can vary, ranging from sweeping structural reforms to small
procedural changes. In all cases, the aim is to enhance the
effectiveness, efficiency, accountability and affordability of the
institution [74]. The value of SSR is clear: a well performing
security sector can uphold law and order in a nation, prevent-
ing the re-emergence of conflict.
When considering a post-cyber warfare context, SSR will
bring value towards restoring peace. The institutions of na-
tional defence, law enforcement and intelligence services
will have an interest in developing a strong cyber capability
in order to tackle threats from cyberspace. Developing this
capability is also in the interests of the UN, since it contributes
towards maintaining long term peace and security in the region
and will enable the eventual withdrawal of cyber peacekeeping
forces.
How this cyber capability could be built, and how it
should look are important questions. It is proposed that the
development of a cyber capability can be assimilated into
already existing procedures. For example, if the cyber security
capability of a particular institution is too strong and is being
oppressive, it may require reigning in. On the other hand, it
should be capable enough to detect and counter cyber crime
and foreign cyber attacks. However, it must be noted that
finding this balance will be politically challenging, as each
nation may have its own opinion of what level of capability is
reasonable. There are also clear links between the DDR and
SSR processes. The DDR process aims to find legal, peaceful
employment for ex-combatants, while the SSR process re-
quires human resources with certain skills. Demobilised cyber
ex-combatants are therefore an important resource for the SSR
process. If the DDR process can harness their existing cyber
abilities, there is potential to find long term employment in a
reformed national cyber defence sector.
UN SSR guidance [73] states that any reform shall not
include activities which compromise the sovereignty and ter-
ritorial integrity of other states, human rights, or activities
contributing to internal conflicts in the host nation. The UN
therefore provides basic training only, and the programme
is carefully designed to not provide any support that would
enhance a country’s capability to wage war or violate hu-
man rights [74]. The same approach must be taken towards
developing a cyber capability. Training should be limited in
scope to performing cyber defence, and policy reforms should
bolster respect for human rights such as privacy and the
right to seek and impart information. In summary, SSR in
the context of cyber will not only be valuable, but essential
towards ensuring long term peace. It is also expected to be
feasible to perform, but future work should aim to identify
any unexpected obstacles.
XII. ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE
UN electoral assistance as an activity has two primary aims.
Firstly, to assist a nation in holding credible and legitimate
elections in line with internationally recognised standards.
Secondly, to build a national capacity to hold future elections
without assistance [34]. The value of this is twofold. Firstly,
periodic and genuine elections are a human right set out in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights [32]. Second, it brings
confidence to the process and to the result: even if your chosen
candidate does not win, the process was fair and there is no
justification for resorting to violence.
The act of voting and the act of counting votes is largely
a kinetic one, even in the most developed nations. In an
environment of physical voting booths and ballot papers,
the cyber domain has arguably little relevance to electoral
assistance. There are however some instances where a cyber
capability could be valuable.
A. Election Hacking
The issue of “election hacking” was brought into promi-
nence after the 2016 US presidential election, with US intel-
ligence agencies claiming that Russia intentionally conducted
hacking to influence the election outcome in favour of Repub-
lican candidate Donald Trump [35]. While the accusations do
not suggest that any voting machines or counting processes
were directly tampered with, it is claimed that Russia hacked
and leaked information to influence the result. While the
election process was not directly hacked, the question of if
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it is a “fair” election in the face of cyber attacks designed
to influence the voters is debatable. Similar questions have
been raised over the French election in 2017 [36] and even
the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom [75].
The USA, France and UK are politically stable enough
to experience such electoral doubt without experiencing a
threat to internal peace and security. In post conflict envi-
ronments, peace will be more fragile with the smallest of
doubt over an election result potentially leading to violence.
Cyber peacekeepers could therefore bring value in combating
both hard (e.g. counting process, voting machines) and soft
(misinformation, fake news) cyber attacks on future elections.
With regards to hard cyber attacks on an election, it must be
noted that even in developed nations, the majority of elections
are paper based and not heavily reliant upon the cyber domain.
The Netherlands abandoned electronic voting in 2008 after
such security concerns led to a loss of confidence by the
public [76]. In this regard, most elections are unlikely to be
threatened by hard cyber attacks.
The feasibility of combating soft attacks on elections is
more challenging. The spread of fake news is a challenge the
world is already trying to combat, with the UK setting up a
government unit specifically for that task in 2018 [77]. The
UN may find it necessary to open a similar unit inside of
conflict regions where an election is due, robustly pointing
out misinformation designed to influence the outcome and
educating civilians on how to spot it themselves. It is fea-
sible that cyber peacekeepers could also provide assistance
to political parties in the run up and during elections. This
assistance would include the securing of party computers and
networks, with the aim of preventing cyber attacks designed
to leak information regarding the candidates. In effect, there is
potential for cyber peacekeepers to perform OMR or a cyber
buffer zone on political party networks in the run-up to an
important election.
Value could also be found in securing parts of the election
infrastructure that do have a cyber component. For example,
information about candidates and voters may be stored in
a database. Cyber peacekeepers may provide value here, by
securing this database and preventing attacks upon its avail-
ability, integrity and confidentiality. There is also the potential
for cyber peacekeepers to provide training and prevention of
social engineering attacks upon candidates and their staff.
In summary, the value that cyber peacekeepers could bring
to electoral assistance largely depends upon the level of cyber
dependence in the election. In cases where the election is paper
based, value will be minimal. Should the UN adopt electronic
voting and tallying, the value will rise in the form of protecting
from hard cyber attacks. Soft cyber attacks on elections are
a relatively new concept, and there is potential value to be
found in combating misinformation and fake news designed to
influence the result. The feasibility of such an activity should
form a basis for future work.
XIII. MINE ACTION
Mine action is an activity designed to reduce the threat and
impact of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), in-
cluding cluster munitions, on peace and security, humanitarian
relief, human rights, and socio-economic development [78].
It has four overall goals. Firstly it aims to reduce risk to
civilians through surveying, marking, fencing and clearance of
affected areas. Secondly mine action works to support victims
of mines by working with a nation to secure access to rights
and services. A third goal is to develop a national capacity
whereby the nation can continue to perform mine action in
the long term without external assistance. The fourth goal is
to educate and promote the issue of mine action at a national
and international level.
The value that mine action brings to the peace process
is high. It allows civilians to resume working the land,
opens up routes to enable trade and prevents physical harm.
Translating the value that mine action brings into the cyber
domain is challenging, since mines are a problem that exist
in the kinetic world. Although mine action cannot be directly
translated, there are striking similarities between the land and
sea problem of mines and the cyber problem of malware. Just
as a field can be littered with mines during conflict, a computer
system can be littered with malware. Both mines and malware
remain hidden until activated or detected, and the harmful
effects persist long after a conflict has ended. These effects
present threats to peace and security, especially if they are
located in critical national infrastructure. It is therefore worth
investigating whether “malware action” could be a feasible
activity which retains the value that mine action brings.
A. Malware Action
To explore whether malware action could bring value to a
peacekeeping operation, figure 6 presents the goals of mine
action and suggests equivalent goals of malware action.
Fig. 6. A comparison of goals between mine and malware action
Figure 6 shows that a cyber equivalent goal that closely
matches can be found in all cases. This suggests that there
may be value in performing malware action and that further
investigation is justified. Malware action is also a feasible ac-
tivity, since technical guidance on how to respond to a malware
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incident is well established in cyber security literature. One
such set of guidelines is provided by the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) [79]. Using these guide-
lines, it is possible to propose how malware action could be
implemented. A seven phase approach towards malware action
is as follows:
Phase one: A request is made for malware action upon a set
of devices or more generally at a particular site of importance.
This is an essential first step, and highlights that malware
action only takes place with consent and invitation of the
network owner.
Phase two: Following a request for malware action, a plan
will be developed. This will include a number of activities:
• Identification of devices and systems
• Prioritisation of systems
• Assignment of resources
• Identification of partners
• Stakeholder meetings to ensure ownership at all levels
and understanding of the process.
• Identification of goals, risks and responsibilities.
Phase three: Surveying of target devices begins. Cyber
peacekeepers examine systems for signs of malware infection.
Phase four: If a device is determined to be infected
with malware, it is marked as such in documentation and
cyber peacekeepers work to contain the malware to prevent
it spreading and causing additional harm. This is equivalent to
the fencing activity in mine action.
Phase five: Cyber peacekeepers work to remove the de-
tected malware. This is equivalent to the clearance stage of
mine action. Technical guidance on malware clearance is given
in section 4.4 of NIST SP800-83 [79].
Phase six: Monitoring and evaluation. Cleaned devices are
monitored over time to confirm that the malware has been
fully removed. The clearance process is evaluated for future
improvements.
These first six phases match the activities of surveying,
marking, fencing and clearance. With regards to malware, a
seventh phase is needed which is not included in existing mine
action documentation.
Phase seven: Recovery of devices and systems to original
state and removal of containment measures. This phase is
analogous to removing barriers around a road once it is cleared
of mines, allowing it to used for its valuable peaceful purpose.
Other goals of malware action such as providing mal-
ware education and coordinating emergency malware response
teams are also feasible, and will likely form a part of cyber
peacekeeping malware action.
XIV. PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Human rights are firmly established at the core of all
peacekeeping operations, and are central to all of its activities.
For example, OMR observes for human rights abuses whilst
electoral assistance aims to ensure everyone’s human right to
genuine and period elections. But in addition to being part of
every peacekeeping activity, the protection and promotion of
human rights is also an activity in itself.
Firstly, human rights issues are highlighted and made
explicit in training and planning documentation. Points at
which a peacekeeping activity has the potential to threaten
human rights are made clear, and advice is given on how
to proceed. This helps to avoid cases where the activities of
peacekeepers themselves have the potential to violate human
rights. Secondly the UN Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights (OHCHR) supports all peacekeeping oper-
ations, providing expert advice regarding human rights on a
day to day basis [80].
A. Protection
Human rights can be threatened both from external actors
and inadvertently by peacekeepers themselves. For example,
a buffer zone may infringe upon a person’s right to freedom
of movement within a country’s borders. By considering how
each activity could threaten human rights, changes can be
made to minimise that threat or manage it in a suitable way.
To consider the value of protecting human rights during
cyber peacekeeping, it must be asked whether human rights
have the potential to be violated both by cyber peacekeepers
and by others in the cyber domain. This was briefly discussed
when making a justification for cyber peacekeeping, where it
was argued that human rights can be threatened by cyber at-
tacks. In particular, the right to life and security of person was
offered as a justification for the need of cyber peacekeeping.
In this section, a deeper exploration of the human rights issues
that surround the concept of cyber peacekeeping is provided.
Research into human rights in cyberspace is extensive [81],
[82], [83], [84], with authors highlighting sexual exploitation,
freedom of speech, digital divides, censorship and privacy as
areas where cyberspace presents human rights threats. The
UN Human Rights Council [85] has emphasised the “unique
and transformative nature of the Internet not only to enable
individuals to exercise their right to freedom of opinion and
expression, but also a range of other human rights, and to
promote the progress of society as a whole” [85]. Other
examples of the UN associating human rights violations and
cyber are found in the expression of concern at the right to
privacy being regularly violated in cyber space [86] and the
passing of a resolution in 2016 condemning any nation which
intentionally disrupted the internet access of its citizens [87].
Looking at the evidence, there is no doubt that the UN regards
the cyber domain as a place where human rights can be
threatened, and that online violations of human rights should
be taken as seriously as offline violations.
From the perspective of avoiding breaches by cyber peace-
keepers, arguably the biggest threat to avoid is a violation of
privacy. Due to the nature of OMR and other activities such
as malware action, there is potential that cyber peacekeepers
will have access to personal information and communications.
Kleffner and Dinnis [27] provide some insight here. They
considered how cyber peacekeepers themselves might inad-
vertently threaten human rights, stating that “interference with
cyber infrastructure or data must be carried out in compliance
with the requirements of human rights law” [27]. However,
they also note that rights such as privacy and freedom of
expression are not absolute: international human rights law
does allow certain interference where national security and
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public order issues are present [27]. In this regard, there is a
balancing act to be made between allowing cyber peacekeepers
to effectively maintain peace whilst also being careful not to
breach human rights unnecessarily. This is therefore a risk that
will need to be managed, and in line with existing procedures
could be achieved via the following:
• Interweaving human rights considerations into cyber
peacekeeping policy, training and evaluation. This would
provide warnings of where extra caution must be taken
and practical measures to minimise breaches.
• Daily support from the OHCHR regarding privacy issues
as they arise. The OHCHR will require cyber-legal ex-
pertise to provide support to cyber peacekeepers in the
field.
These are feasible activities to perform, since they already
take place as part of the existing peacekeeping framework. As
each cyber peacekeeping activity is developed, human rights
must be considered and guidance provided on how to ensure
their protection. This would clearly be a valuable activity, and
one that should be performed.
B. Promotion
There are also opportunities for cyber peacekeeping to bring
value by promoting human rights. At a local level, cyber
peacekeepers are in a position to influence states to adopt poli-
cies and legislation that respects human rights in cyberspace.
Arguably the best path to achieve this is through security sector
reform (SSR). During SSR, a respect for privacy and other
human rights can be promoted and included into policy and
legislation reforms. This is a feasible activity to perform, since
cyber peacekeepers are taking a leading role in the reform of
national security institutions, a position which provides real
opportunities for human rights promotion. It is also prudent to
consider the value of promoting cyber related human rights on
the international stage as a standalone activity. It is proposed
that this activity would be more suited to other organisations
and UN departments, and not to cyber peacekeeping. This is
because cyber peacekeeping will be deployed in response to
a specific situation, and with a specific mandate. Promoting
cyber related human rights on a general level is unlikely to be
part of this mandate, and more likely to fit better into work of
other actors such as the UN Human Rights Council. It must
be noted that the promotion of human rights will likely be
one area where political obstacles will be encountered: not all
nations will share the UN’s perspective on human rights, and
some will resist attempts to impose certain values upon their
nation.
In summary, cyber peacekeeping must protect against vi-
olations of human rights from two sources: external parties
and from cyber peacekeeping itself. Protecting from external
sources is largely covered in other activities such as OMR,
electoral assistance and malware action. It therefore requires
no separate action as part of this activity. To protect against
violations from cyber peacekeeping itself, it has been proposed
that the risk can be managed through an emphasis on human
rights issues in cyber peacekeeping training and planning
documentation. The Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights can also provide further support, although this
office will require the necessary cyber-legal expertise to do so.
XV. RESTORE AND EXTEND STATE AUTHORITY
Following a conflict, a nation’s control over its territory and
borders may be weak or absent. Without the ability to operate
a government and provide basic services to the population, the
stability of the nation and security of its population is under
threat. The restoration and extension of state authority (RESA)
is therefore one of the activities of a multi-dimensional peace-
keeping operation. The UN Department of Civil Affairs lists
the following tasks as part of RESA [88]:
• Supporting development of transparency and account-
ability: State authority relies on gaining the trust of
citizens. Encouraging the government to be transparent
and accountable in its actions is essential.
• Assessment of capacity and support needs: A review
of the current situation and what assistance is required to
improve it.
• Performance Monitoring: Identifying where weaknesses
lie and how they could be improved.
• Civic Education: Citizen participation in areas such as
voting is crucial, and this task aims to educate citizens
on their role in the process.
• Logistic and Administrative support: Providing basic
logistical and administrative assistance.
• Small-scale capacity-building support: E.g. training
elected officials in local finance or budgeting.
• Supporting policy, planning and decision-making pro-
cesses: State institutions may be starting from scratch and
will require assistance in developing the basic processes
undertaken by a state.
• Support to resource mobilization: Directing donor re-
sources to areas of most need.
The UN makes it clear that its role in these tasks is always a
supporting one, rather than as a substitute for the state. Terms
such as enable and facilitate are used, to avoid creating a
situation where the UN is seen to be providing services, rather
than the state. By encouraging the state to be the provider,
trust between citizens and government begins to develop. To
explore whether cyber peacekeeping could bring value to the
restoration and extension of state authority, it is necessary to
ask whether a state’s ability to generate revenue and provide
basic services can depend upon cyberspace. A problem here is
that there is no definition of “basic service”, since it can vary
depending upon the culture and expectations of the population.
The UN Department of Civil Affairs [88] provides some
guidance, proposing that water, sanitation, health and primary
education are basic services common to all nations. Taking this
list, it must be argued that the value of cyber peacekeeping
towards providing these services is largely dependent upon a
nation’s level of cyber dependence. Two scenarios highlight
this point.
A. Scenario A: Low Cyber Dependence
Nation ‘A’ has a low level of cyber dependence. The
government revenue office works on standalone computers
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with local databases. The water supply is delivered from a
central plant which has no external cyber connections. The
value that cyber peacekeeping could bring in restoring state
authority here is small. Restoring the functioning of the water
plant or resuming operation of the tax office will likely be
kinetic tasks with no need for cyber capability.
B. Scenario B: High Cyber Dependence
Nation ‘B’ has a more cyber dependent infrastructure.
Government departments are interconnected via an integrated
IT system, which allows the sharing of information between
departments, cloud storage and online access to government
services for citizens. Power is supplied by a smart grid whilst
driverless trains and smart traffic systems connect cities. Cyber
peacekeeping will clearly bring greater value to the peace
process here since restoring the functioning of these cyber
dependent systems and fending off future attacks will be
crucial in restoring basic services to civilians.
In cases where cyber peacekeeping would prove valuable,
it is also expected to be feasible. Evidence for this comes
from the fact that it is possible to present examples of how
existing activities could be applied to the cyber domain. Some
examples to demonstrate this are provided in figure 7.
Fig. 7. Examples of restoration of state authority activities in cyber peace-
keeping
In summary, cyber peacekeeping will bring value to the
restoration and extension of state authority only in cases where
state cyber dependence is moderate or high. In the aftermath
of cyber warfare, states may find difficulty in bringing cyber
dependent infrastructure back online, and this has the potential
to weaken state authority and subsequently delay the return of
peace and security in the region.
XVI. SUPPORTING ROLE ACTIVITIES
The final two activities of a UN peacekeeping operation are
socio-economic recovery and humanitarian assistance. These
are marked as supporting roles, since the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations aims to support the work of other
organisations and UN departments in these areas, rather than
become directly involved. For completeness, these final two
activities will be examined for any value that they could bring
in relation to cyber warfare.
A. Socio-Economic Recovery
Long term social and economic recovery is important for
long lasting peace and ultimately for the future prosperity of
a nation. The DPKO is open about lacking the expertise and
resources for this task, and peacekeeping operations are often
not mandated to become involved. Despite this, peacekeep-
ing operations are often able to support the process where
necessary through facilitating efforts and acting as a conduit
between multiple organisations.
It is proposed that there is one potential area where cyber
peacekeeping could bring value. Public trust in financial
systems is an essential component of any economy [89],
and should that trust be damaged by cyber warfare, there is
potential for a threat to peace and security. In such a scenario,
it is arguable that cyber peacekeepers could play a role in
securing it, thereby increasing public confidence in the nation’s
financial system. Despite this potential, the stated approach of
this research is to respect existing peacekeeping doctrine. It is
therefore arguable that such a task would be better suited to
other organisations, rather than cyber peacekeepers, especially
when considering the long term nature of economic recovery
and the cost of a cyber peacekeeping operation. In line with
existing practice, it is therefore concluded that the primary
responsibility for socio-economic recovery remains with other
organisations and departments, but that cyber peacekeeping
can provide technical support where necessary.
B. Humanitarian Assistance
Humanitarian assistance is primarily a kinetic activity,
aimed at providing food, shelter and other essential services
to people in need. It is difficult to propose a role that cyber
peacekeepers could play in this activity, and therefore its
value towards bringing peace and security is low. It can be
argued that enabling (and reducing the need for) humanitarian
efforts via ensuring functioning public services e.g. power,
clean water etc. is valuable, but this result is a by-product
of other cyber peacekeeping tasks such as a buffer zone,
malware action and restoration of state authority. It is therefore
concluded that cyber peacekeeping has no direct value towards
humanitarian assistance, only an indirect one through the
performance of other activities.
XVII. FUTURE WORK
In this article we have explored the concept of cyber
peacekeeping and examined each existing activity for value
and feasibility in a post-cyber warfare context. While we have
proposed an initial short list of activities which would be both
practical to perform and valuable towards maintaining peace,
we have also discovered new areas of interest which are worth
studying further.
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A. Further development of activities
This article has briefly covered each UN peacekeeping
activity and has reached an initial conclusion on which hold
the potential to be valuable and feasible in recovering from
cyber warfare and which would not. This is effectively a ”first
pass” to shortlist those with the most potential. In the longer
term, further work is needed to go deeper into each activity
and fully explore how it could be technically performed. This
work will need to draw from multiple disciplines. For example,
with regards to protecting people’s right to privacy there are
many research fields to examine and draw expertise from.
These include technical fields such as advances in privacy-
preserving technology [90], [91], [92] and wider social and
political debates such as how human rights relate to cyber
space [93].
B. Compliance with core UN values
While we have considered activities according to two cri-
teria - value and feasibility, future work must also consider
how each activity would comply with the core UN values
of consent, impartiality and non-use of force. If any activity
violates these values, it would not be suitable as a UN activity.
C. Challenges of Cyber Peacekeeping
Cyber peacekeeping will face a number of challenges, some
of which have been already discussed such as attribution. But
we must also consider broader challenges, both technical and
political. Firstly there is the issue of resistance at all levels -
local, regional and national. While two opposing factions or
nations may agree to peace at the highest level, this may not
translate into automatic compliance with cyber peacekeepers at
ground level, especially at sensitive sites such as CNI. Further
exploration of the potential for resistance and how to overcome
it would be valuable.
A second obstacle is the technical challenges CNI presents.
Facilities such as power plants and water facilities have proper-
ties which make observation and monitoring more challenging
than standard network monitoring techniques [94]. The use
of proprietary protocols, air-gapping and a 24/7 availability
requirement means that OMR or a cyber buffer zone on these
systems will require a specialised set of skills that are in high
demand globally.
This also leads to a third challenge: securing peacekeepers
in the numbers required with these highly desirable skillsets
will be a challenge in itself. UN peacekeeping operations of
today are carried out by a combination of full time UN staff,
and contributions of troops and police from UN member states.
Potential sources of cyber peacekeepers will therefore likely
include cyber military units from UN member states (e.g.
US Cyber Command). However, it will also be important to
consider other sources such as cyber security experts from
private industry. A discussion on how the right expertise can
be secured in the necessary numbers, and at a price that is
within an operation’s budget will therefore be a necessary
future research topic.
It is likely that many more obstacles exist, and we rec-
ommend that each activity concluded to be valuable and
feasible should be developed in more detail to discover where
additional obstacles lie and how to resolve them.
D. Other Peace Activities
While this article has focused upon UN peacekeeping, it
would also be prudent to explore other peace activities such
as conflict prevention and peace enforcement.
Considering conflict preventing, the UN has shown a desire
to be more proactive and prevent conflict before it erupts.
Preventing conflict is cheaper than attempting to manage it
once it has erupted [95], [15] and it has been argued that the
UN’s primary function should be to prevent violent conflict
from starting, rather than attempting to restore peace in its
aftermath [95]. There is also an argument that the international
community has a moral duty to prevent harm to civilians
wherever possible, and not simply in the period following
warfare [15]. Preventive peace deployments of the past have
been generally regarded as successes [96]. The concept of
preventive cyber deployments is therefore something which
could be valuable in the future. It is also in line the findings
of our research that cyber peacekeeping will focus upon
preventing cyber attacks, rather than attempting to attribute
them.
It is also reasonable to consider peace enforcement. Could
the UN authorise cyber peace enforcement in order to protect
civilians? While such an event seems valuable, the feasibility
would likely be questionable. Research into cyber warfare [8]
has shown that there is still no answer to questions such as
what constitutes an armed attack or what the ethical boundaries
of cyber warfare are. With the five permanent members of the
Security Council all holding a veto, unanimous consensus is
difficult to achieve even in the kinetic domain. In the cyber
domain, these problems are amplified to a point where it is
difficult to foresee the Security Council agreeing to enforce
peace based upon a cyber conflict. In depth study of how
cyber peace enforcement could work and the value it could
bring would be useful.
E. Cyber Peacekeeping Reservists
One of the biggest obstacles towards the feasibility of
performing valuable activities was the attribution problem.
Research is ongoing in this area, but future work in the area
of cyber peacekeeping reservists based at backbone providers
would be beneficial to evaluate whether it would bring a
solution quicker. The rationale behind the concept is based
upon research by Wheeler and Larsen [51], who state that
solving the attribution problem requires prepositioned trust be-
tween backbone providers, enabling them to work together and
trace attacks when required. This was shown to be difficult,
with Wheeler and Larsen [51] stating that “to be effective
many attribution techniques require some sort of cooperation
by networks along the path from the attacker to the victim.
Gaining such trust, unfortunately, can be very difficult” [51].
A second identified problem is that of funding, with Wheeler
and Larsen [51] noting that attribution technology will have
a financial cost. Without a clear business case to invest in
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attribution, commercial network operators find no reason to
purchase it.
It was proposed that the UN is an ideal organisation
from which prepositioning of trust and funding of attribution
technology could take place. The UN would approach network
owners and request for one or two staff members to become
cyber peacekeeping reservists. These people would not leave
the organisation, but would be able to “activate” when required
and cooperate with other reservists at other networks to
perform attribution together. The UN would fund the required
technology, since it is envisioned that this cost would be
insignificant considering the value that reliable attribution of
cyber attacks would bring to international peace and security.
The following research questions for future work are therefore
proposed:
• Would internet backbone organisations be willing to join
the initiative? Potential incentives to join are compensa-
tion, free training for the reservists, and the technology
being supplied for free.
• What would the cost of the scheme be (purchase of
technology, maintenance, training etc.) and would the UN
be willing to fund it?
• Could the scheme bring in additional funding e.g. from
nations using the service to trace cyber attacks outside of
a warfare context?
• What attribution technology is available for use in the
scheme?
• Who should be selected as a reservist and what issues
may arise? (Leaving the organisation, unavailability etc.)
• How do reservists come together to coordinate a trace
back and what is practically required to do so?
• Are there any existing models which it could build upon?
(e.g. Estonian cyber defence unit)
• Is the final result effective? This could involve trials of
the scheme.
• Could the scheme address more than just attribution? E.g.
The ability to counter increasingly massive distributed
denial of service attacks through the quick cooperation
of multiple backbone organisations.
Answering these questions would provide a significant con-
tribution towards the concept of cyber peacekeeping reservists,
and would help to establish if the scheme was viable. This
would have a significant impact on global peace and security,
since it would improve the potential for cyber attacks to be
properly attributed and potentially provide further benefits
such as an internationally coordinated response to distributed
denial of service attacks.
XVIII. CONCLUSION
Research into conducting and understanding cyber warfare
is extensive and wide ranging [8], yet research into restoring
peace after cyber warfare is sorely lacking. In this article, we
have begun to address this gap in research. We argued that as
cyber warfare becomes an increasing part of wider conflict,
peacekeeping organisations such as the United Nations will
find it necessary to perform cyber peacekeeping.
We offered a definition of cyber peacekeeping followed
by an analysis of existing work on the topic. We opted to
approach the topic in a manner that respects and builds upon
existing UN peacekeeping doctrine. We justified this approach,
showing that it would bring a number of benefits. We then
examined all UN peacekeeping activities and discussed the
value and feasibility of performing each one in a post-cyber
warfare context. The results are summarised in figure 8, and
show that there are valuable and feasible activities that cyber
peacekeepers could perform.
Fig. 8. Summary of cyber peacekeeping activities
We conclude that while cyber peacekeeping is not neces-
sarily needed today, it will be required in the near future
as cyber warfare becomes more commonplace. Organisations
such as the UN will find it an increasing necessity to operate
in cyberspace in order to maintain peace. This article has
only begun the process of defining this new role, and future
work must build upon these foundations so that peacekeeping
organisations can be best prepared to maintain peace in the
cyber domain.
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